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Abstract: Fault tree analysis is useful both in designing new products/services or in dealing with 
identified problems in existing ones. In the quality planning process, the analysis can be used to 
optimize process features and goals and to design for critical factors and human error. As part of 
safety process improvement, as it is emphasized in the present paper, it can be used to help identify 
root  causes  of  undesired  events  such  as  occupational  injuries  and  illnesses.  A  case  study  of 
application  in  industrial  safety  systems  illustrates  the  aim,  principle  and  structure  of  the 
technique, allowing better prevention measures selection and implementation. 
 
Keywords:  fault  tree  analysis,  safety  assessment,  probability  of  occurrence,  minimal  cut  set, 
system safety 
 
1. FAULT TREE ANALYSIS: HISTORY, AIM AND PRINCIPLE 
 
Failure tree analysis (FTA) was, in terms of time, the first method designed to achieve a 
systematic  review  of  industrial  risk.  Developed  in  the  early  1960s  by  Bell  Telephone 
Company, the method has been tested for safety of missile launching systems [2,9]. Aimed at 
determining the causal chain and combinations of events that can cause an undesirable event, 
failure tree analysis is currently applied in many fields such as aeronautics, nuclear industry, 
petrochemical industry, etc. The technique provides a graphical aid for the analysis and it 
allows  many  failure  modes  including  common  cause  failures. FTA  is  widely  used  in  the 
design  phase  of  nuclear  power  plants,  subsea  control  and  distribution  systems,  and  for 
oversight studies in layers of protection studies for process safety and loss control in chemical 
plants and refineries so as to prevent accidents and control the costs of risks [2,14].  
The method can also be used for retrospective analysis of accidents in this case the 
ultimate  undesired  event  being  already  occurred,  so  its  production  scenario  has  been 
observed. In this case, the method is called the root-cause analysis [4, 6]. FTA is deductive 
method.  [3, 15]. In principle, it aims at building, from an undesired event defined a priori, 
chains of events or combinations of events that can generate the top event. Basically, it goes 
from one cause to another, until there are reached those basic events likely to be at the origin 
of unwanted events [7, 8, 12]. Basic events generally correspond to: 
  elementary events sufficiently known and described in other ways, so it is not useful 
to look for primary causes; some of them may be frequent enough so that one can 
estimate the probability of occurrence based on statistics; 
  events which can not be considered as basic, but for whom is not relevant to identify 
the causes; 
  events whose causes will be further analyzed, e.g. by a new application of the method; 
  events that normally occur and are repeated during the process or plant operation. 
The  method  uses  a  particular  graphic  symbolism,  which  allows  presentation  of  the 
results as a tree structure. Symbols and significance of events and logic gates that can be used 
in the construction of fault trees are shown in Table 1. Auxiliary details of logical symbols 
used can be found in the standard IEC 61025:1990 "Fault Tree Analysis" [5]. 
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Table  1. Symbols used to represent events and logic gates [5] 
 
   
2. STRUCTURE OF THE ANALYSIS PROCEDURE 
 
  In  essence,  the  method  requires  going  through  the  following  three  stages:  (i)  the 
definition of the top undesired event; (ii) the fault tree development; (iii) the tree valorization. 
They are preceded by a preliminary step, consisting in system’s description [10, 18]. This 
stage is vital to conduct analysis and often require prior identification of risks.  
Starting from the top event, placed on top of the tree, branching develops through logical 
connections of intermediate events and combinations of events that can lead to primary failure 
of system’s parts. The tree is complete when all branches are developed until primary failures. 
Selecting  and defining intermediate events is performed step by step, paying attention  to 
identifying direct and immediate causes, which must be necessary and sufficient. Otherwise 
the result will be, partially or totally, wrong [1, 13, 16].  
  The development of the fault tree is in accordance with the flowchart shown in Figure 
1. The basic requirement consists in the systematic search for direct, necessary and sufficient 
causes. Qualitative analysis of the tree aims to establish the extent to which a failure event 
corresponding to a basic causal chain can propagate to the final “top” event. Calculation rules 
are of the type presented for purposes of illustration in Table 2.    Fiabilitate si Durabilitate - Fiability & Durability    No 1/ 2012 
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Fig. 1. FTA development flow-sheet 
 
Table 2.Rules for Fault Tree’s  quantitative analysis valorization [5] 
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It is accepted that, for low probability primary events, the occurrence probability of the  
final event is the sum of the probabilities associated with minimal cut sets. If quantitative 
analysis is done, the goal is to estimate based on probability of occurrence of basic events, the 
probability of occurrence of the final event, as well as intermediate events (see Fig. 2). 
 
 
Fig. 2. Determining the final event probability 
 
Assuming that data are available for events A, B and C, then they can be considered as 
primary events, and there is no need to further develop the fault tree. 
 
  3. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE FAULT TREE 
 
Each tree failure is associated with a finite number of minimal cuts that are unique paths 
leading to the top event occurrence. Generally, the smaller the rank of a minimal cut, then its 
contribution to the system failure is more important. Therefore, special attention should be 
given to these components to eliminate or, if this is not possible, at least to minimize their 
effect [17]. 
The occurrence of the top event (T) can be expressed in terms of finite minimal cut sets 
(Ki) by the expression: 
           T=K1 U K2 U…U Kk=
k
i 1 
Ki                                                                 (1) 
Identification of minimal cuts of a fault tree can be done by various methods. Top-
down  and  bottom-up  assessments  methods  are  used,  based  on  Boolean  algebra  and 
differing only by the place wherefrom the analysis is initiated. 
For top-down methods, the minimal cut sets are identified starting from the top 
event  and  descending  to  the  primary  events,  while  when  bottom-up  techniques  are 
used the process is started at lowest level and mounts progressively to the top event. 
Quantitative  analysis  of  fault  tree  synthesis  consists  in  synthesizing  the  top  event 
reliability features based on primary events reliability features. Quantitative assessment is 
carried out in steps, calculations are performed starting from basic levels corresponding to 
primary events towards the top event. 
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If the fault events are independent, thr following assessments can br performed, based on 
failure probabilities or failure rates. 
 
3.1.Failure probability-based assessments 
For an "AND" logic gate with n inputs, the output events can by expressed by the 
following equation: 
 
  P(E1∩E2∩...∩En) = P(Ei)-P(E2)·....·P(En)                                (2)    
               
For an "OR" logic gate with n inputs, the output events can by expressed by the 
following equation: 
     P(E1UE2U... UEn)≈P(E1) + P(E2) + .... + P(Ell)                                   (3)
           
3.2. Failure rates-based assessments 
Admitting the hypothesis that, input events Ei do have constant λi failure rates, the 
equations bellow will express the failure rate λE for the output event: 
  for an "OR" logic gate with n inputs: 



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1
                                     (4)
     
  for an "AND" logic gate with n inputs: 
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The  previously  calculated  indicators  are  punctual  reliability  characteristics  of  the 
analyzed system. In the case of fault trees containing one or more repeated events the above 
method can not be applied because some events to output port are no longer independent. In 
this  case  top  event’s  occurrence  probability  calculation  is  done  using  minimal  set  cuts 
identified during the qualitative analysis of the fault tree. Also, the method based on the set of 
minimal cuts can be applied to any type of tree, with or without repeated events. 
 
Let Ki: i=l...k be the minimal set cuts of a fault tree. The occurrence of a top event T, 
the analysed critical event as a function of Ki can be expresed as inthe eq. (6), given bellow: 
 
                                                                      (6)                                                          
 
while the to event probability is: 
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Equation (6) can be writen as: 
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In this expression the first term has the highest significance, the second term has a lower 
significance  since  he  is  a  multiplication  of  probabilities,  and  so  on,  each  term  is  less 
significant than the previous.  
Equation (7), containing numerous terms, and gives the precise value of the top event 
probability of occurrence, can be considerably simplified, retaining only the first or the two 
first terms. Approximations that are obtained in both cases are as much closer to the actual 
values, as the components failure probabilities are smaller. It is easily found that: 
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                                Lower margin                     Upper margin 
                                                                                                                 
The approximate relationship allowing to calculate the upper margin is also known in  
probability theory as the law of rare events. 
Another  method  for  approximating  the  upper  limit  for  the  probability  of  top  event 
occurrence, also based on the use of minimal cut sets is presented below. 
Following notations are made: 
P(T) - probability of top event occurrence; 
P( i K ) – probability of minimal cut sets  occurrence Ki; 
P( i K ) - probability of minimal cut sets  non-occurrence Ki; 
From equation (7) it comes that: 
                           
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) ( ) (                                                                             (10)                                                                       
But while      i i K K P 1 ) (                                                                                    (11)                                      
 
equation (9) is rewritten as it follows:    


 
k
i
i K P T P
1
) ( 1 ) (                                                                                                             (12) 
The  event  „non-occurrence  of  none  minimal  cut  set”  is  given  by  the  intersection 
of i K events, so it comes that: 
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From relationships (11) and (12) results: 
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  Finally: 
                                 
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It follows that this mode of approximation to the likelihood of top event occurrence 
leads to an error lower than when using the approximation based on the law of rare events.  
 
4.  CASE-STUDY:  FTA  FOR  THE  WATER  SUPPLY  SYSTEM  OF  AN 
INDUSTRIAL FACILITY 
 
We have analysed and built the fault tree for a water supply system of an industrial 
secondary facility (SA). The analysed system, presented in Figure 3, consists of two pipes 
which simultaneous operation is permanently required to supply water into the SA system. 
The two pipes start from the same reservoir (tank) R and have installed on them in series one 
manual valve V, an electric powered pump P and a clapper valve C.  The pipes themselves are 
not considered, for simplicity. 
  Safety function: The SA system must be supplied with a given Q water quantity. 
  System’s environment: is not considered (no external agression risk). 
  Initial  state  of  components:  valves  are  opened,  pumps  activated,    sunt  deschise, 
pompele sunt activate, valves allow water toflow towards the SA system and the 
tank is full. 
 
Fig. 3. Schematic representation of the analyzed system 
Top unwanted event definitionl: It is denominated ” SA system not feededt” briefly written as 
“QSA=0”. 
Logical diagram of the fault tree development:  It starts from placing the unwanted top event 
in the top diagram: QSA = 0. This event is classified as "failures on the system", which does 
not give any information of "input" type wherefrom it comes. In our case, it can be noticed 
that if the system is not supplied for that flow downstream of valves C1 and C2 is zero, we 
can build the second level of the tree, see Fig. 4.  
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Fig.  4. Fault tree’s second level 
 
Developing the intermediate event Q=0, downstream of C1, it has as immediate causes 
the occurrence of event “C1 blocked” or “Q=0 upstream of C1”. Achievement of one of the 
two events is enough to produce the intermediate event.   
At this stage of decomposition occurs for the first time an event that relates directly to a 
component, namely event "C1 blocked", which will be followed by a three-input OR and 
entries stating: 
  primary failure (due to damper flap stiffness, e.g. C1 in closed position);  
  secondary    failure  (which  is  usually  due to a failure  conditions  of  use,  such  as  a 
corrosion  preventing  throttle  opening;  this  event  will  be  further  developed  and  is 
represented by a rhomb), and 
  failure due to inadequate controls, but not related to valve;  The  tree  now  has  the 
structure given in Fig. 5: 
   
 
 
Fig.5. Fault tree’s 3
rd level development 
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Further  developing  the  intermediate  event  "Q  =  0  upstream  of  C1"  which  is  the 
category of defects on the system and is equivalent to "Q = 0 downstream of P1" reaching at 
the previously treated case of C1 valve. By doing in the same manner, we reach to achieve the 
decomposition in the following scheme, which notes that "P1 does not work". Consequently, 
it follows a three-input OR-gate, one entry corresponds to a control malfunction, reduced to 
basic event "Loss of electrical power supply" (see Fig. 6). For this branch, the deductive 
procedure ends with the decomposition of event "Q = 0 upstream of P1" which is identical to 
"Q = 0 downstream of V1". A closer look at the diagram representing the system allows 
emphasizing  the  immediate causes of this last event, which are "V1 closed" and "Q = 0 
upstream  of  V1".  We  notice  that  appears,  for  the  second  time,  a  malfunction  due  to 
inappropriate orders, in this case non-execution of an operation which this time is attributable 
to a man who could have several reasons: simple forgetfulness or disregard, the operator is 
confident that he opened the valve but he did not. 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Fault tree’s 4
th level development  
 
The flowchart of the Fault Tree, relative to the second route, is developed in the same 
manner, being symmetrical to that achieved for the first route is shown in Fig. 7. 
 
 
 
 
   Fiabilitate si Durabilitate - Fiability & Durability    No 1/ 2012 
  Editura “Academica Brâncuşi” , Târgu Jiu, ISSN 1844 – 640X 
 
 
 
 
64 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Fig. 7. Flowchart of the Fault Tree, relative to the second route 
 
  It is noted that the same events occur in the two paths of logical scheme such as events 
"empty tank" or "loss of electrical power." These events are called as “common cause faults” 
and must be reviewed carefully. 
 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
As  illustrated  through  the  case  study  performed  on  a  water  supply  system  of  an 
industrial  facility,  the  fault  tree  analysis  is  a  systematic,  deductive  and  probabilistic  risk 
assessment tool which elucidates the causal relations leading to a given undesired event. It 
was  also  highlighted that  quantitative  FTA  requires  a fault  tree and  failure  data of basic 
events. Development of a fault tree and subsequent analysis require a great deal of expertise, 
which may not be available all the time. An undesired state of a system is analyzed using 
boolean logic to combine a series of lower-level events. This analysis method is mainly used 
in the field of safety engineering and reliability engineering to determine the probability of a 
safety accident or a particular system level (functional) failure 
FTA is very good at showing how resistant a system is to single or multiple initiating 
faults. It is not good at finding all possible initiating faults. After the fault tree has been 
assembled for the specific analyzed undesired event, it will be evaluated and analyzed for any 
possible improvement or in other words study the risk management and find ways for system 
improvement. This stage is as an introduction for the final step which will be to control the 
hazards identified.  
The tool aids the design process, shows weak links that cause failures, and in the 
critical legs of the trees helps to define maintenance strategies for which pieces of equipment 
and processes should be defended with the greatest maintenance vigour to prevent “Murphy” 
from shutting down the process or causing serious safety issues. 
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Fig. 8. The final logical diagram of the Fault Tree for the quantitative analysis   
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The technique is helpful for identifying critical fault paths, observing vague failure 
combinations before they occur in reality, comparing alternate designs for safety, and setting a 
methodology to provide management with a tool to evaluate the overall hazards in a system 
and avoid single sources of critical failures.   
Finally when thinking top down about failures and where/how they can occur, the 
methodology gives a diagram for setting maintenance strategies for protecting key pieces of 
equipment/processes to prevent failures and provide occupational health and safety of 
workers. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
[1]  Desroches, A. - Concepts et méthodes probabilistes de base de la sécurité. Editions 
Lavoisier TEC&DOC, Paris, 1995. 
[2]  Favaro, M., Monteau, M. - Bilan des methodes d’analyse a priori des risques.  Cahiers 
de Notes Documentaires, nr. 139/1990, pag. 363. 
[3]  Fadier,  E.  -  L’intégration  des  facteurs  humains  dans  la  sûreté  de  fonctionnement. 
Revue de la sûreté de fonctionnement - Phoebus, numéro spécial, pag. 59-78, 1998.  
[4]  Kirwan, B. - Validation of human reliability assessment techniques –Part 1 & 2. Safety 
Science, vol. 27, nr. 1/1997, pag. 25-75, Elsevier. 
[5]  IEC 61025. Fault Tree Analysis International Standard IEC 61025, 1990 IEC, Geneva 
[6]  Laprie, J.C. - Guide de la sûreté de fonctionnement. Editions Cépaduès, 1995.  
[7]  Mäckel, O., Rothfelder, M. Challenges and Solutions for Fault Tree Analysis Arising 
from Automatic Fault Tree Generation: Some Milestones on the Way. ISAS-SCI (1) 
2001: 583-588 
[8]  Macwan, A., Mosleh, A. -  A methodology for modelling operator errors of commission 
in probabilistic risk assessment. Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Elsevier 
Science Limited, pag. 139-157, 1994.  
[9]  Moraru, R., Bǎbuţ, G. - Analizǎ de risc. Editura Universitas, Petroşani, 2000. 
[10]  Moraru, R., Bǎbuţ, G., Matei, I.  - Ghid pentru evaluarea riscurilor profesionale. 
Editura FOCUS, Petroşani, 2002. 
[11]  Moraru,  R.,  Băbuţ,  G.  -  Managementul  riscurilor;  Abordare  globală-Concepte, 
principii şi structură. Editura Universitas,Petroşani, 2009. 
[12]  Moraru,  R.,  Băbuţ,  G.  -  Evaluarea  şi  managementul  participativ  al  riscurilor 
profesionale, Editura Focus, Petroşani, 2010, ISBN:978-973-677-206-1. 
[13]  Price, H.E. - The allocation of  functions in systems. Human factors, vol. 27, pag. 33-45, 
1985. 
[14]  Rasmussen, J. - Risk management in a dynamic society: a modelling problem. Safety 
Science, vol. 27, nr. 2-3/1997, pag. 183-213.  
[15]  Reason,  J.  -  A  system  approach  to  organisational  error.  Ergonomics,  vol.  38,  nr. 
8/1995, pag. 1708-1721.  
[16]  Vanderhaegen, F., Polet, P. - Evaluation des performances dans l'analyse des risques, 
Communication  présentée  au  Groupement  pour  la  Recherche  en  Productique, 
http://www.univ-savoie.fr/grp2000, Annecy,  Franţa, 23-24.03. 2000. 
[17]  Vesely, W. E., Goldberg, F. F., Roberts, N. H.,. Haasl, D.F. Fault Tree Handbook. U. 
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG-0492, Washington, 1981 